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Abstract	
Countries	 that	 seek	 to	 provide	 universal	 health	 coverage	 deal	 with	
considerable	 publicly	 funded	 expenses.	 This	 article	 discusses	 if	 a	 private	 health	
insurance	 subsidy	 policy	 can	 reduce	 the	 expenses	 covered	 by	 the	 public	 system.	 A	
theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 in	 which	 individuals	 are	 characterized	 by	 two	
dimensions:	 inherited	 risk	 of	 illness	 and	 preferences	 for	 prevention	 activities.	 It	 is	
shown	that	when	beneficiaries	of	a	voluntary	plan	have	lower	risk,	i.e.	advantageous	
selection	scenario,	a	subsidy	raises	heath	expenses	if	articulation	between	coverage	is	
complementary.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios	 a	 subsidy	 reduces	
expenditure	 if	 articulation	 is	 supplementary.	 Intermediate	 scenarios	 are	 also	
considered	 where	 articulations	 between	 coverages	 have	 both	 complementary	 and	
supplementary	 components,	 which	 is	 apparently	 the	 case	 for	 the	 Colombian	 health	
system.	 Calibrated	 numerical	 simulations	 are	 provided	 using	 the	 Colombian	 system	
data.	 The	 calibration	 strategy	 employed	 reveals	 that	 selection	 is	 adverse	 in	 the	
Colombian	voluntary	health	 insurance	market.	Furthermore,	we	 identify	 the	 level	of	
subsidy	 and	 changes	 in	 articulation	 ሺtowards	 supplementarityሻ	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 a	
reduction	in	public	spending.	
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1. Introduction	
Government	 intervention	 in	 health	 service	 markets	 and	 social	 security	 insurance	
schemes	 ሺhealth,	 pension,	 etc.ሻ	 is	 varied:	 it	 can	 go	 from	 direct	 provision	 of	 health	
services	to	regulation	of	private	markets.	Public	intervention	in	the	health	sector	can	
have	 a	 double	 purpose.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 State	 intervention	 tries	 to	 correct	market	
failures,	which	are	mainly	consequence	of	the	presence	of	asymmetric	information	in	
health	 insurance	 markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 lot	 of	 countries	 aim	 to	 provide	
universal	health	coverage,	but	at	 the	same	time	aim	to	hold	back	or	diminish	public	
health	 expenses,	 due	 to	 inefficiencies	 that	 could	 cause	 an	 excessive	 raise	 of	 public	
expenses.34	In	many	health	systems	where	public	and	private	coverages	coexist,	it	has	
been	 proposed	 to	 subsidize	 private	 insurance	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 allows	 iሻ	 to	 enlarge	
coverage	 against	 the	 financial	 risks	 caused	 by	 expenditures	 in	 health	 iiሻ	 to	 reduce	
expenses	 made	 by	 the	 public	 system	 because	 of	 the	 migration	 of	 individuals	 from	
public	to	private	coverage	plan.	
The	interaction	between	two	factors	seems	to	explain	whether	subsidies	to	voluntary	
plans	 increase	 or	 decrease	 public	 expenditure:	 1ሻ	 the	 nature	 of	 selection,	 that	 is,	 if	
individuals	 that	 purchase	 voluntary/private	 plans	 have	 a	 higher	 risk	 ሺadverse	
selectionሻ	 or	 lower	 risk	 ሺadvantageous	 selectionሻ	 relative	 to	 average	 risk	 of	 public	
system	beneficiaries;	2ሻ	the	nature	of	the	relationship,	or	articulation	between	public	
coverage	 and	 coverage	 provided	 by	 private	 health	 insurance	 contracts,	 that	 is,	 if	
private	contracts	complement	or	substitute	public	coverage.	When	the	articulation	is	
complementary,	 coverage	 by	 the	 private	 sector	 allows	 access	 to	 higher	 quality	
services,	but	also	pays	off	out‐of‐pocket	expenses	not	 covered	by	 the	public	 system.	
Conversely,	a	supplementary	articulation	means	 that	 individuals	choose	 to	purchase	
private	health	coverage	and	exit	the	public	health	system	which	does	not	generate	any	
more	expenses	 for	this	sector.5	There	is	also	an	alphabet	soup	of	mid‐way	scenarios	
between	these	two	systems,	which	are	characterized	by	mixed	articulations	that	have	
both	complementary	and	supplementary	components.6	
                                                            
3 The	goal	of	universal	health	coverage	is	to	ensure	that	all	people	have	access	to	health	services	they	
need,	without	having	to	go	through	financial	hardship	in	order	to	pay	for	them.	On	December	12	2012,	
the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations	unanimously	adopted	a	resolution	that	recognizes	the	role	
of	 health	 in	 achieving	 international	 development	 goals.	 It	 urges	 governments	 to	 move	 towards	
providing	all	people	with	access	to	affordable,	quality	health‐care	services.	
http://www.who.int/universal_health_coverage/un_resolution/en/ 
4  Inefficiencies	 brought	 about	 by	 distortions	 that	 health	 financing	 can	 bring	 into	 the	 labor	 market,	
especially	in	Bismarckian	systems.	
5 For	example	Medicaid	program	in	the	United	States	does	not	admit	individuals	who	have	additional	
coverages	of	private	insurances. 
6 In	the	national	health	systems	in	Spain	and	United	Kingdom,	there	is	a	supply	of	private	insurances	
that	are	used	by	individuals	to	gain	access	to	providers	that	usually	are	not	in	the	public	system	supply.	
Individuals	are	always	beneficiaries	of	the	public	system,	nevertheless	they	can	use	services	provided	
by	the	private	insurance	which	can	replace	or	substitute	for	public	coverage.	On	the	other	hand,	some	
plans	offer	access	to	health	technology	that	are	not	covered	by	the	public	system,	which	complements	
the	coverage	offered	by	the	public	system. 
The	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 first	 factor	 has	 evolved	 around	 the	 presence	 of	
asymmetric	 information,	 which	 has	 a	 particular	 resonance	 in	 health	 insurance	
markets,	particularly	because	 its	consequence	 is	 that	markets	will	not	have	efficient	
allocations,	 at	 least	 in	 a	 first‐best	 perspective	 ሺRothschild	 and	 Stiglitz,	 1976;	Harris	
and	 Townsend,	 1981ሻ.	 Asymmetric	 information	 leads	 to	 scenarios	 of	 over	 or	
underinsurance	that	affects	the	possible	impact	of	the	subsidy	ሺPauly,	1974;	Einav	et	
al.,	 2010ሻ.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 subsidy	may	decrease	 the	 underinsurance	 caused	by	
adverse	 selection,	 or	 it	 can	 worsen	 the	 overinsurance	 caused	 in	 the	 event	 of	
advantageous	selection.	
A	 theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 analyze	 how	 the	 interaction	
between	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 individuals	 who	 purchase	 voluntary	 health	
insurances	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 public	 and	 private	 coverage	 affect	 public	
expenditure	 when	 voluntary	 insurances	 are	 subsidized.	 Basically,	 individuals	 can	
choose	to	have	public	coverage	only,	or	to	buy	a	private	coverage	that	offers	a	better	
service.	 The	 articulation	 between	 public	 and	 private	 coverage	 is	 parametrized	 in	 a	
way	such	that	situations	of	complementary	and	supplementary	coverages,	as	well	as	
intermediate	scenarios	can	be	considered.	
Agents	are	heterogeneous	in	two	dimensions:	On	the	one	hand,	they	differ	by	
their	inherited	health	risk;	on	the	other	hand,	they	have	different	preferences	for	self‐
protection	activities,	which	decrease	the	probability	of	suffering	from	an	illness.	Even	
though	these	two	dimensions	have	countervailing	effects	on	the	probability	of	illness,	
they	both	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	willingness	to	pay	for	a	private	health	coverage	
plan,	which	offers	a	better	quality.	Then,	scenarios	of	both	adverse	and	advantageous	
selection	 are	 recreated,	 depending	 on	 the	 relative	weight	 of	 each	 dimension	 on	 the	
probability	of	 illness	and	the	willingness	to	pay	for	the	insurance,	which	determines	
the	 private	 insurance	 demand	 function.	 In	 the	 scenario	 of	 advantageous	 selection	
ሺrespectively	 adverse	 selectionሻ,	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	 those	 individuals	
who	 purchase	 a	 private	 coverage	 plan	 is	 less	 ሺresp.	 moreሻ	 than	 the	 average	
probability	of	those	who	remain	with	public	coverage.	
Analytical	results	show	that	in	the	advantageous	selection	scenario,	a	subsidy	
increases	 expenses	 in	health	 care	 if	 coverage	 articulation	 is	 complementary.	On	 the	
contrary,	 in	 the	 adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 a	 subsidy	 decreases	 expenses	 if	
articulation	is	sufficiently	supplementary.	In	the	intermediate	scenarios,	subsidies	can	
have	 ambiguous	 consequences	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 public	 expenditure.	 Therefore,	we	
calibrate	 our	model	 using	 data	 from	 the	 Colombian	 health	 system,	which	 seems	 to	
have	 components	 of	 both	 complementary	 and	 supplementary	 in	 its	 articulation	
between	private	and	public	health	 coverage.	The	calibration	strategy	applied	allows	
us	to	determine	a	unique	level	of	articulation	for	each	selection	scenario	ሺadverse	or	
advantageousሻ.	 Also,	 our	 calibration	 exercise	 reveals	 that	 it	 is	 the	 adverse	 selection	
scenario	that	is	the	closest	to	the	observed	total	public	expenditure.	
Based	 on	 this	 calibration,	 numerical	 simulations	 are	 performed.	 They	 reveal	
that	a	scenario	of	adverse	selection	with	a	sufficiently	supplementary	articulation	 is	
the	 most	 promising	 for	 a	 subsidy	 program	 to	 contribute	 to	 diminish	 public	
expenditure.	 Being	 the	 articulation	 between	 public	 and	 private	 coverage	 a	 political	
decision,	 this	 simulation	 describes	 how	 that	 articulation	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	
intervention	 tool,	 which	 together	 with	 a	 subsidy	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 decline	 of	 public	
expenses.	 If	 the	 selection	 is	 adverse,	 small	 changes	 in	 the	 level	 of	 complementarity	
ሺtoward	a	more	supplementary	scenariosሻ	and	subsidies	of	a	moderate	magnitude	can	
lower	public	expenditure.	On	the	contrary,	if	selection	is	advantageous,	even	under	a	
completely	 supplementary	 articulation,	 subsidies	 would	 increase	 public	 spending	
regardless	of	its	amount.	
This	 paper	 makes	 a	 contribution	 by	 proposing	 a	 bi‐dimensional	 model	 that	
leads	 to	 a	 very	 simple	 way	 of	 recreating	 adverse	 and	 advantageous	 selection	
scenarios.	Leaving	out	a	few	exceptions	ሺFinkelstein	and	McGarry,	2006;	Olivella	and	
Schroyen,	2011;	Einav	et	al.,	2013;	Veiga	and	Weil,	2014ሻ,	economic	theory	has	mainly	
focused	on	unidimensional	insurance	models	ሺRothschild	and	Stiglitz,	1976;	De	Meza	
and	 Webb,	 2001;	 Einav	 et	 al.,	 2010ሻ,	 which	 do	 not	 allow	 to	 recreate	 adverse	 and	
advantageous	 selection	within	a	unified	approach.	This	work	proposes	a	model	 that	
recreates	 both	 of	 the	 selection	 scenarios	 through	 a	 parameter	 that	 represents	 the	
relative	 weight	 of	 the	 two	 previously	 mentioned	 dimensions	 which	 intervene	 in	
opposite	directions	 in	order	to	determine	heath	risk	but	that	 increase	willingness	to	
pay	for	voluntary	plans.	
This	paper	also	makes	part	of	literature	that	studies	the	role	of	private	health	
insurance	subsidies	in	systems	where	private	and	public	insurances	coexist.	Some	of	
the	 work	made	 try	 to	 evaluate	 if	 subsidies	 can	 generate	 enough	 savings	 for	 public	
expenses	to	cover	the	costs	of	the	subsidies,	nevertheless	in	countries	like	the	United	
Kingdom,	Australia,	or	Spain,	it	has	been	found	that	the	cost	of	a	subsidy	exceeds	the	
benefit	for	the	public	sector	ሺEmmerson	et	al.,	2001;	Frech	and	Hopkins,	2004;	López	
and	Vera‐Hernández,	2008ሻ.	It	has	been	shown	recently	that	reductions	in	the	health	
insurance	 subsidy	 generates	 a	 net	 savings	 for	 the	 Australian	 government	 ሺCheng,	
2014ሻ	or	that	in	the	United	States	of	America,	for	each	dollar	of	tax	subsidies	for	care	
of	 the	 elderly,	Medicaid	 saves	 approximately	 $0.84	 ሺGoda,	 2011ሻ.	 Still,	 some	 of	 the	
literature	 has	 used	 dynamic	 models	 to	 show	 that	 complete	 removal	 of	 the	 tax	
subsidies	can	lead	to	a	partial	collapse	of	insurance	markets,	reduction	of	the	coverage	
and	 less	 welfare	 ሺJeske	 and	 Kitao,	 2009ሻ.	 Our	 analysis	 contributes	 to	 the	
understanding	of	the	factors	that	affect	the	effect	of	a	private	health	insurance	subsidy	
on	public	expenditure	and	identifies	a	political	tool	that	leads	to	obtain	the	preferred	
effects	on	public	expenses.	
The	plan	of	 this	 article	 is	 as	 follows.	 The	 second	 section	presents	 the	model.	
The	third	section	is	devoted	to	the	calibration	strategy	and	the	numerical	simulation	
results.	The	fourth	and	last	section	presents	the	conclusions.		
	
2. The	Model	
In	this	section	a	theoretical	model	is	developed	in	order	to	determine	how	the	effect	of	
a	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expense	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 how	
coverage	 offered	 by	 private	 insurance	 articulates	 with	 public	 coverage.	 Three	
subsections	are	described:	supply	of	the	coverages	and	its	articulation,	characteristics	
of	the	policyholders,	and	public	expense	and	subsidy	function.	
2.1	Insurance	supply	and	articulation	between	coverages	
In	 this	 model	 two	 types	 of	 insurance	 policies	 are	 offered	 to	 cover	 health	
expenses:	
− Coverage	1:	those	enrolled	in	this	coverage	benefit	from	Xଵ%	coverage	ሺwhich	
means	that	beneficiaries	assume	out‐of‐pocket	expenses	of	1 െ Xଵሻ.		
− Coverage	2:	those	enrolled	in	this	coverage	benefit	from	Xଶ%	coverage	ሺout‐of‐
pocket	expenses	of	1 െ Xଶሻ.		
It	 is	 assumed	 that	 0 ൏ Xଵ ൑ 1	 and	 0 ൏ Xଶ ൑ 1,	 and	 that	 Xଶ ൐ Xଵ,	 which	means	 that	
coverage	2	is	more	generous	than	coverage	1.	Every	policyholder	must	be	enrolled	in	
one	of	these	two	coverages.	
The	expenses	made	by	beneficiaries	of	coverage	1	are	completely	covered	by	
the	 public	 insurance.	 The	 proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 made	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	
coverage	 2	 that	 are	 covered	 by	 public	 insurance	 is	α	 with	 0 ൑ α ൏ 1	 while	 a	
proportion	 of	 1 െ α	 is	 covered	 by	 the	 private	 insurance.	 This	 means	 that	 α	 is	 the	
parameter	 that	 represents	 the	articulation	between	 the	 two	coverages.	The	 types	of	
articulation	that	there	can	be	depend	on	α:		
	
− Purely	supplementary:	This	case	corresponds	to	α ൌ 0.	In	other	words,	the	only	
expenses	 covered	 by	 the	 public	 systems	 are	 the	 ones	 generated	 by	
beneficiaries	of	coverage	1.		
	
− Purely	 complementary:	 It	 corresponds	 to	 α ൌ Xଵ/Xଶ.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 public	
insurance	 covers	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 made	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	
coverage	2	when	αXଶ ൌ Xଵ.7	
	
− Complementary‐supplementary:	 It	 corresponds	 to	 values	 of	 α	 such	 that	
0 ൏ α ൏ Xଵ/Xଶ.	 In	 this	 intermediate	 scenario,	 public	 insurance	 covers	 a	
proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 generated	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	 coverage	 2	 when	
0 ൏ αXଶ ൏ Xଵ.	
	
2.2	Policyholders’	heterogeneity	
	
Policyholders	 are	 heterogeneous	 in	 two	 dimensions	 which	 are	 their	 private	
information.	θ	captures	the	inherited	risk	of	having	an	illness	and	it	is	known	by	each	
individual.	For	example,	an	 individual	may	know	her	 family	background,	which	may	
increase	her	willingness	to	pay	for	a	higher	level	of	coverage,	while	this	information	is	
                                                            
7 This restriction on the value of α is imposed due to the fact that it is inequitable (and politically unlikely) for 
the public  insurance to take on a  larger coverage  for a  fraction of the people that can purchase a private 
insurance, which corresponds to the higher‐income fraction. Therefore, α should be subject to αXଶ ൌ Xଵ. 
unknown	 by	 the	 insurance	 company.	 φ	 represents	 preventive	 attitudes	 or	 self‐
protection	activities	 that	 individuals	may	 carry	out.	These	may	be	healthy	habits	or	
self‐care	 interventions	 that	 decrease	 probabilities	 of	 future	 illness.8	 9	 Even	 though	
these	 two	 dimensions	 that	 differentiate	 individuals	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	
individual’s	 willingness	 to	 pay	 for	 coverage	 Xଶ,	 they	 have	 opposite	 effects	 on	 the	
probability	of	illness.		
	
The	population	 is	defined	by	a	 joint	distribution	Fሺθ, φሻ	with	θ, φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.	We	
define	 ω ൌ ωሺθ,φሻ	 as	 the	 function	 that	 represents	 individual’s	 preferences	 for	
insurance,	where		∂ω ∂θ ൐ 0⁄ 	 and	 ∂ω ∂φ⁄ ൐ 0.	 In	 addition,	we	 define	 h ൌ hሺθ, φሻ	 as	
the	 function	 that	 represents	 the	 probability	 of	 illness	where	 ∂h ∂θ⁄ ൐ 0, ∂h ∂φ⁄ ൏ 0	
and	h ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.	
	
While	coverage	1	is	funded	by	public	resources,	individuals	have	to	pay	a	price	Pଶ	to	
benefit	from	coverage	2.		uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ	and	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ	denote	individual	i’s	utility	level	from	having	coverage	1	or	2	respectively,	with	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ	strictly	decreasing	on	Pଶ.	Taking	into	account	what	has	been	previously	stated,	individuals	choose	coverage	2	if	
and	only	 if	 	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ ൒ uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ,	 i.e.	 if	 they	obtain	a	greater	 level	of	utility	with	coverage	 2	 than	 with	 coverage	 1.	 We	 define	 wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ≡ maxሼPଶ|uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ ൒uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻሽ,	 the	maximum	price	 that	 individual	 i	 is	willing	 to	pay	 in	 order	 to	benefit	
from	 coverage	 2.	 wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ 	 ∈ ൣw,w൧	 where	 w	 and	 w	 are	 the	 lower	 and	 upper	
boundaries,	 respectively,	of	 the	distribution	of	wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ,	which	 is	represented	 in	the	following	expression:	
	
wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൌ ωሺθ୧, φ୧ሻCUଶሺXଶ െ Xଵሻ,	 ሺ1ሻ	
where	 CUଶ	 denotes	 the	 unitary	 cost	 of	 health	 attention	 for	 each	 coverage	 2	
beneficiary.	
	
Assuming	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 price	 Pଶ ∈ ൣw,w൧,	 we	 define	 wෝሺθ,φ, Pଶሻ ≡
w|wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൌ Pଶ	 as	 the	 willingness	 to	 pay	 that	 makes	 policyholders	 indifferent	between	purchasing	or	not	purchasing	coverage	2.	For	the	above	reasons,	individuals	
that	purchase	coverage	2	are	those	for	which	wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൒ wෝሺθ,φ, Pଶሻ.		
Enrollment	 in	 one	 of	 the	 two	 coverages	 is	 mandatory	 and	 without	 loss	 of	
generality,	we	assume	that	total	population	is	of	mass	1.	Therefore,	coverage	1	and	2	
demand	functions	are	given	by:	
	
                                                            
8  This  is  a  reduced  form  of  a more  sophisticated model  in which  individuals  choose  directly  a  level  of 
prevention. However, because the goal is not to model the prevention but to understand its consequences, 
a simpler form has been chosen. 
9  The  two  dimensions  in  our  model  are  compatible  with  empiric  and  theoretical  literature  of 
multidimensional  individuals  in  selection scenarios  (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Veiga and Weil, 2014; 
Einav et al., 2013). 
Dଶሺθ,φሻ ൌ න 1൫wሺθ,φሻ ൒ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൯
ஶ
ିஶ
dFሺθ,φሻ ൌ Prሾwሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൒ wෝሺθ,φ, Pଶሻሿ	
ሺ2ሻ	
and		
	
Dଵሺθ, φሻ ൌ 1 െ Dଶሺθ,φሻ.	
ሺ3ሻ	
	
hതሺθ, φሻ ≡ Eሾhሺθ,φሻሿ	is	the	average	probability	of	illness	that	characterizes	the	
general	 population.	 Policyholders	 who	 benefit	 from	 to	 coverage	 1	 have	 an	 average	
probability	 of	 illness	 of	 hതଵሺθ, φሻ ≡ Eሾhሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ|wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൏ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻሿ;	 and	 people	
who	benefit	 from	 to	 coverage	2	have	 an	 average	probability	of	 illness	of	hതଶሺθ, φሻ ≡
Eൣh൫θ୨, φ୨൯|w൫θ୨, φ୨൯ ൒ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൧.	
	
Comparing	values	taken	on	by	hതଵሺθ, φሻ	and	hതଶሺθ, φሻ	indicates	the	nature	of	the	
selection	that	prevails.	More	precisely,	 if	policyholders	who	benefit	 from	coverage	2	
have	a	greater	average	probability	of	illness	than	policyholders	in	coverage	1,	then	the	
selection	 that	 prevails	 is	 adverse	 ሺadverse	 selection	 if	 hതଵሺθ, φሻ ൏ hതଶሺθ, φሻሻ.	On	 the	
contrary,	 if	 policyholders	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 2	 have	 a	 smaller	 average	
probability	 of	 illness	 ሺthan	 individuals	 in	 coverage	 1ሻ,	 selection	 is	 advantageous	
ሺadvantageous	selection	if	hതଵሺθ, φሻ ൐ hതଶሺθ, φሻሻ.	
	
The	average	probability	of	illness	for	people	who	benefit	from	coverages	1	and	
2	are	respectively:	
hതଵሺθ, φሻ ൌ E൫hሺθ୧, φ୧ሻหwሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൏ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൯ ൌ 1F൫wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൯න hሺθ, φሻdF
୵ෝ൫஘,஦,୔మ൯
୵ሺ஘౟,஦౟ሻ
	
ሺ4ሻ	
and	
	
hതଶሺθ, φሻ ൌ E൫hሺθ୧, φ୧ሻหwሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൒ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൯ ൌ ଵଵି୊൫୵ෝሺ஘,஦,୔మሻ൯ ׬ hሺθ, φሻdF
୵ሺ஘౟,஦౟ሻ
୵ෝ ሺ஘,஦,୔మሻ .	
ሺ5ሻ	
	
2.3	Subsidy	and	public	expenditure	
	
A	subsidy	is	offered	by	the	government	to	policyholders	who	opt	for	coverage	
2.	The	total	public	expenditure	function	Gሺθ, φ, sሻ	is	defined	as	the	function	of	all	of	the	
costs	generated	by	policyholders	who	benefit	 from	each	of	 the	coverages	 funded	by	
public	resources.		
	
The	effects	of	the	subsidy	on	the	average	probability	of	sickness	of	coverages	1	
or	2	beneficiaries	are	respectively	determined	by	the	partial	derivatives	of	the	average	
probabilities	as	a	function	of	the	subsidy,	which	are	ሺsee	appendix	1	for	more	detailsሻ:	
	
܌̅ܐ૚ሺી, ૎, ܛሻ
܌ܛ ൌ
૚
۴ሾܟෝሺી,૎, ܛሻሿ
܌ܟෝሺી,૎, ܛሻ
܌ܛ ൣܐሾܟෝሺી,૎, ܛሻሿ െ ̅ܐ
૚ሺી,૎, ܛሻ൧,	
	
܌̅ܐ૛ሺી,૎, ܛሻ
܌ܛ ൌ
૚
૚ െ ۴ሾܟෝሺી,૎, ܛሻሿ
܌ܟෝሺી, ૎, ܛሻ
܌ܛ ቂ̅ܐ
૛ሺી, ૎, ܛሻሺી, ૎, ܛሻ െ ܐሾܟෝሺી,૎, ܛሻሿቃ.	
The	 following	 Lemma	 summarizes	 the	 consequences	of	 a	 subsidy	upon	 the	 average	
probabilities	of	sickness	depending	on	the	chosen	coverage.	
	
Lemma	1:	A	subsidy	increases	policyholders’	average	probability	of	sickness	in	
both	 coverages	 if	 selection	 is	 advantageous.	 Conversely,	 this	 average	 probability	
decreases	with	a	subsidy	if	selection	is	adverse.	
	
It	 is	assumed	that	 the	premium	associated	with	 the	coverage	2	 is	equal	 to	 its	
actuarial	value,	which	corresponds	to	the	expected	value	of	the	cost	that	the	 insurer	
must	 assume	 for	 the	 claims	 that	 beneficiaries	 to	 that	 level	 of	 coverage	 have.10	We	
assume	that	the	price	offered	corresponds	only	to	claim‐related	expenses	and	not	any	
other	ሺfor	example	administrative,	legal	representation	expenses,	etc.ሻ.	Therefore,	the	
price	that	an	individual	has	to	pay	in	order	to	benefit	from	coverage	2	is	equal	to	the	
actuarial	 premium	minus	 the	 amount	 offered	 the	 public	 subsidy.	 Thus,	 the	 price	 of	
enrollment	in	coverage	2	is:	
	
Pଶሺθ, φ, sሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻXଶCUଶhതଶሺθ, φሻ െ s.	
ሺ6ሻ	
	
Because	 a	 positive	 subsidy	 reduces	 the	 price	 paid,	 this	 implies	 that,	 ceteris	
paribus,	more	 individuals	will	purchase	coverage	2.	 If	 the	selection	 is	advantageous,	
individuals	 that	 change	 coverages	 because	 of	 the	 subsidy	 are	 those	 coverage	 1	
beneficiaries	who	have	 lesser	probability	of	 illness	ሺthese	also	have	a	greater	 illness	
probability	than	those	under	coverage	2ሻ,	because	of	this	the	transfer	of	the	marginal	
individual	implies	an	increase	of	the	average	probabilities	under	both	coverages.	The	
opposite	happens	in	the	adverse	selection	scenario.		
	
The	total	public	expenditure	function	is	defined	as:	
	
Gሺθ, φ; sሻሻ 	ൌ XଵCTଵሺθ, φ, sሻ ൅ αXଶCTଶሺθ, φ, sሻ ൅ sሾDଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ,	
ሺ7ሻ	
where	 CT୧ሺθ, φ, sሻ ൌ CU୧hത୧ሺθ, φ, sሻD୧ሺθ, φ, sሻ	 is	 the	 total	 cost	 generated	 by	 the	
beneficiaries	of	coverage	level	i	with	i ∈ 	 ሼ1,2ሽ.	Therefore,	the	demand	for	coverages	1	
                                                            
10 A fair actuarial premium  is chosen  for simplification purposes  (assuming competitive market) therefore, 
strategic behavior of firms who offer coverage 2, considering the government subsidy, is not considered. If 
we assume a utility margin  that  insurance  companies  charge  in  the premium, our  results do not  change 
qualitatively. 
and	 2	 ሺequations	 ሺ2ሻ	 and	 ሺ3ሻሻ	 and	 the	 average	 probabilities	 of	 coverage	 1	 and	 2	
beneficiaries	 ሺequations	 ሺ4ሻ	 and	 ሺ5ሻሻ	 also	 depend	 on	 the	 government	 subsidy.	 We	
suppose	 that	CUଵ ൏ CUଶ,	which	captures	 the	ex	post	moral	risk	phenomenon	due	to	
the	fact	that	coverage	Xଵ ൏ Xଶ.	
	
Replacing	ሺ2ሻ,	ሺ3ሻ,	ሺ4ሻ	and	ሺ5ሻ	in	ሺ7ሻ	one	obtains:	
	
Gሺθ, φ; sሻ ൌ XଵCUଵhതଵሺθ, φ, sሻሾ1 െ Dଶሺθ,φ, sሻሿ ൅ αXଶCUଶhതଶሺθ, φ, sሻDଶሺθ, φ, sሻ
൅ sሾDଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ.	
ሺ8ሻ	
	
Expression	 ሺ8ሻ	 is	 the	 objective	 function	 that	 determines	 the	 effect	 of	 the	
subsidy,	depending	on	the	sign	of	∂Gሺsሻ ∂ሺsሻ⁄ .	The	expected	results	of	the	effect	of	the	
subsidy	on	the	expenditure	function	for	each	of	the	possible	scenario	ሺeach	nature	of	
the	selection	and	articulation	between	the	two	coveragesሻ	are	presented	below.	
	
The	 effect	 of	 a	 subsidy	 on	 the	 expenditure	 function	 is	 given	 by	 equation	 ሺ9ሻ	 ሺsee	
appendix	1	for	details	on	this	derivationሻ:	
dGሺsሻ
ds ൌ X
ଵCUଵ dwෝሺsሻds ቂሺ1 െ fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ ቀhത
ଶሺsሻ െ hതଵሺsሻቁቃ	
ሺ9.1ሻ	
൅ dwෝሺsሻds ቂhത
ଶሺsሻሺ1 െ 	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ െ hሾwෝሺsሻሿቃ ሾαXଶCUଶ െ XଵCUଵሿ	
ሺ9.2ሻ	
൅1 െ Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ െ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ ୢ୵ෝሺୱሻୢୱ s.	
ሺ9.3ሻ	
The	 three	 components	 of	 expression	 ሺ9ሻ	 allow	 us	 to	 predict	 the	 effect	 of	 a	
subsidy.	It	 is	known	that	∂wෝሺsሻ ∂s⁄ ൏ 0	due	to	the	fact	that	a	subsidy	initially	lowers	
the	price	of	coverage	2	as	seen	in	ሺ6ሻ.	In	an	adverse	selection	scenario,	hതଶሺsሻ ൐ hതଵሺsሻ	
which	 means	 that	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 will	 be	 negative	 when	 1 ൐ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	 In	 an	 advantageous	
selection	scenario	ሺ9.1ሻ	will	be	positive11	when	1 ൐ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	The	sign	of	ሺ9.2ሻ	depends	
on	 the	 articulation	between	 coverages	 ሺαሻ	 and	 the	 sign	of	 the	 expression	hതଶሺsሻሺ1 െ
	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ െ hሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	 Finally,	 ሺ9.3ሻ	 is	 always	 positive.	 The	 following	 proposition	
summarizes	the	consequences	of	a	subsidy	on	public	expenditure.		
	
Proposition	1.	The	effect	of	a	subsidy	on	public	expenses	are	the	following:	
iሻ When	 selection	 is	 advantageous,	 public	 expense	 increases	 with	 the	
subsidy	 if	 articulation	 between	 the	 two	 coverages	 is	 sufficiently	
complementary.	
                                                            
11 Except for continuous distributions, most probability distributions take on values lower than 1. 
iiሻ When	selection	 is	 adverse	and	elasticity	of	demand	 is	 sufficiently	 low,	
public	expenditure	decreases	with	a	subsidy	when:	
aሻ Adverse	selection	is	sufficiently	strong	and	articulation	is	sufficiently	
complementary;	
bሻ Adverse	selection	is	sufficiently	weak	and	articulation	is	sufficiently	
supplementary.	
iiiሻ In	intermediate	cases,	the	effect	of	subsidies	is	ambiguous.	
	
The	 first	 ሺiሻ	 statement	 in	 Proposition	 1	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 the	
selection	 is	 advantageous	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 is	 positive,	 while	 the	 sign	 of	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 depends	 on	 the	
articulation	between	 coverages.	More	precisely,	when	 the	 articulation	 is	 sufficiently	
complementary	then	αXଶCUଶ ൐ XଵCUଵ	and	ሺ9.2ሻ	is	positive.	In	such	a	case,	the	subsidy	
increases	 public	 expenses	 unambiguously.	 It	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 there	 is	
advantageous	 selection,	 subsidy	 raises	 the	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	
beneficiaries	 of	 both	 coverages	 ሺLemma	 1ሻ.	 If	 on	 top	 of	 that,	 the	 articulation	 is	
sufficiently	complementary,	the	increase	of	the	average	probability	of	illness	of	people	
that	purchase	coverage	2	produces	an	externality	that	contributes	to	increase	public	
expenses.	
The	second	statement	ሺiiሻ	 is	particularly	 interesting	because	 it	points	out	 the	
complex	interaction	between	the	articulation	nature	and	the	adverse	selection.	It	can	
be	seen	 that	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 is	always	negative	when	 there	 is	adverse	selection,	while	 ሺ9.3ሻ	 is	
always	positive.	Consider	the	case	where	the	demand	is	sufficiently	inelastic,	such	that	
ሺ9.3ሻ	does	not	generate	a	first‐order	effect	and	that	adverse	selection	is	strong	enough	
to	 ensure	 that	 hതଶሺsሻሺ1 െ 	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ ൐ hሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 it	 yields	 that	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 is	
negative	 when	 the	 articulation	 is	 sufficiently	 complementary,	 that	 is,	 if	 αXଶCUଶ ൐
XଵCUଵ.	As	the	subsidy	decreases	the	average	probabilities	of	individuals	in	both	levels	
of	coverage	in	the	adverse	selection	scenario,	then	a	greater	complementarity	implies	
a	 reduction	 of	 pubic	 expense	 because	 it	 causes	 a	 positive	 externality,	 that	 is,	 this	
decrease	of	average	probability	of	illness	of	coverage	2	beneficiaries	lower	the	amount	
of	expenditure	funded	by	public	resources.	On	the	contrary,	when	adverse	selection	is	
not	 so	 strong,	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 is	 only	 negative	 if	 the	 articulation	 between	 both	 coverages	 is	
sufficiently	supplementary.		
The	third	statement	ሺiiiሻ	in	Proposition	1	shows	that	there	are	other	scenarios	
in	 which	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 is	 ambiguous.	 Next	 section	
proposes	 various	 numerical	 simulations	 in	 order	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 effect	 of	
subsidies	in	these	cases.	
	
	
3. Numerical	Exercise	
The	 Colombian	 heath	 system	 is	 an	 ideal	 scenario	 to	 simulate	 our	 theoretical	
model.	 In	 Colombia,	 a	 public	 health	 insurance	 system	 coexists	 with	 a	
voluntary/private	 insurance	market.	 According	 to	official	 figures,	 in	2012,	 9.65%	of	
the	 public	 health	 system	 beneficiaries	 had	 a	 private	 insurance	 policy.12	 The	 public	
system	 fee	 ሺUnit	 of	 Payment	 for	 Capitation‐UPCሻ	 is	 determined	 according	 to	 the	
gender,	 age,	 and	 location	of	 the	beneficiary.	 It	 is	568,944	COP	on	average.13	For	 the	
private	 system,	 there	 are	 different	 prices	 offered	 by	 the	 market,	 but	 the	 average	
amount	is	2,270,000	COP	per	year.	
	
3.1	Calibration	Strategy	
Flowchart	 1	 shows	 all	 of	 the	 steps	 taken	 as	 a	 calibration	 strategy.	A	 random	
number	sequence	was	generated	to	simulate	a	uniform	distribution	of	parameters	θ	
and	 φ	 with	 θ, φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.14	 Based	 on	 this	 information	 the	 following	 functions	 are	
estimated:	 hሺθ, φሻ ൌ 1 ൫1 ൅ expሺkφ െ θሻ൯⁄ 	 and	ωሺθ, φሻ ൌ θ ൅ φ,	with	 k ൐ 0.	 k	 is	 the	
parameter	 that	 stand	 for	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection,	 where	 k ൏ 1	 stands	 for	 the	
scenarios	 of	 adverse	 selection	 while	 k ൐ 1	 stands	 for	 scenarios	 of	 advantageous	
selection.	 Finally,	 when	 k ൌ 1	 no	 selection	 type	 prevails.	 The	 data	 is	 calibrated	
according	to	the	information	observed	for	the	Colombian	health	system	on	2012.15	
At	this	stage,	we	do	not	make	any	assumptions	regarding	the	value	of	k	and	the	
functional	 forms	 of	 hሺθ, φሻ	 and	 ωሺθ, φሻ	 are	 used	 to	 stand	 for	 the	 adverse,	
advantageous,	 and	 neutral	 scenarios.	 Based	 on	 the	 observed	 demand	 for	 voluntary	
insurance	in	the	Colombian	market	in	2002	ሺDଶ ൌ 0,096ሻ,	we	obtain	the	demands	for	
coverages	1	and	2.	With	this	information	we	find	the	average	probability	of	illness	for	
every	level	of	coverage	in	each	selection	scenario.	By	setting	ሺ1ሻ	and	ሺ6ሻ	to	be	equal	
and	 assuming	 that	 initially	 there	 is	 no	 subsidy,	 we	 find	 the	 value	 of	 α∗ ൌ 1 െ
ൣሺXଶ െ Xଵሻωሺθ, φሻ Xଶhതଶሺθ, φ, 0ሻ⁄ ൧	 for	 each	 of	 the	 selection	 scenarios	 that	 solves	 the	
equilibrium	 price	 observed	 in	 Colombia	 in	 2012	 ሺPଶ ൌ 2.270.000ሻ.	 With	 this	 value	
for	α∗	 we	 infer	 the	 value	 of	 CUଶ,	 which	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 same	 in	 all	 selection	
scenarios.	Table	1	summarizes	all	of	the	simulated	data.	It	can	be	seen	that	CUଶ ൐ CUଵ,	
to	capture	the	presence	of	ex	post	moral	risk.	α∗	decreases	as	selection	type	changes	
from	adverse	to	advantageous.	Nevertheless,	for	simulated	selection	scenarios,	there	
is	no	α∗	that	allows	for	the	articulation	between	coverages	to	be	purely	supplementary	
or	 complementary.	 Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 probability	 distribution	 of	 illness	 for	
individuals	 that	purchase,	or	do	not,	private	 insurance	 for	different	values	of	k.	This	
figure	 illustrates	 how	 that	 parameter	 represents	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 that	
prevails	in	markets.		
                                                            
12 Fasecolda (www.fasecolda.org), and the Superintendencia Nacional (http://www.supersalud.gov.co). 
13  Information  taken  from  a  study  made  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Protection:  Estudio  de 
suficiencia y de  los mecanismos de ajuste de riesgo de la Unidad de Pago por Capitación para garantizar el 
Plan Obligatorio de Salud en el año 2013 (Study of sufficiency and of risk adjustment mechanisms of the Unit 
of Payment for Capitation to guarantee the Obligatory Plan of Health in the year 2013) 
14  In addition to the simulation of a uniform distribution for the values of θ and φ, simulations were made 
using exponential, normal, beta and gamma distributions. Results are shown in appendix 2. 
15 A logit function is chosen to model the probability of illness as a function of the parameters θ and φ. 
ω(θ,φ) follows a triangular distribution. 
With	the	data	presented	in	Table	1,	the	willingness	to	pay	function	wሺθ, φ, 0ሻ,	
was	estimated.	Figure	2	presents	that	function’s	distribution	and	its	relationship	with	
the	probability	of	illness.	It	is	seen	how	this	relationship	is	represented	by	a	rhombus	
ሺor	 rhomboid,	 depending	 on	 the	 selection	 typeሻ	 and	 how	 wෝሺθ,φ, 0ሻ	 ሺblack	 lineሻ	
divides	the	distribution	between	those	who	choose	coverage	1	ሺunder	the	black	lineሻ	
or	coverage	2	ሺabove	the	black	lineሻ.		
Two	simulation	exercises	are	shown	below.	The	first	one	reveals	the	effects	of	a	
subsidy	 on	 public	 expenses	 without	 any	 changes	 in	α∗,	 i.e.	 taking	 as	 given	 the	
articulation	 between	 coverages	 that	 emanated	 from	 the	 calibration	 strategy.	 The	
second	 one	 points	 out	 the	 effect	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 level	 of	 articulation	 between	
coverages	and	the	subsidy	would	have	on	public	expenses.		
	
3.2	Simulation	1:	Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	without	changes	in	α∗	
	
Flowchart	2	exhibits	all	of	the	steps	taken	in	the	simulation	exercise.	In	the	first	
one,	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 subsidy	 is	 simulated	 as	 a	 policy	 tool	 that	 generates	
migration	of	 individuals	 from	coverage	1	 to	coverage	2,	without	any	changes	on	the	
degree	of	articulation	between	coverages.16	Figure	3	depicts	the	effect	of	the	subsidy	
on	public	 expenditure	according	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	prevailing	 selection	 type.	Each	
colored	 line	 represents	 the	 government’s	 expense	 function	 relative	 to	 the	 level	 of	
public	subsidy.	The	two	uppermost	ሺblue	and	redሻ	are	the	adverse	selection	scenarios;	
the	 middle	 line	 ሺgreenሻ	 is	 the	 neutral	 selection	 scenario;	 and	 the	 lowermost	 lines	
ሺyellow	and	greyሻ	represent	the	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	For	each	selection	
scenario	proposed	there	is	a	unique	degree	of	complementarity	ሺα∗ሻ	between	the	two	
coverages	 that	 allows	 a	 simulation	 of	 the	 observed	 equilibrium	 prices	 in	 the	
Colombian	market	 in	 2012	 ሺpresented	 in	 Table	 1ሻ.	 It	 can	 be	 noticed	 that	 the	more	
adverse	the	selection	scenario	is,	the	greater	the	value	of	alpha;	however,	no	value	is	
equal	to	zero	or	to	the	highest	possible	value	for	alpha	ሺα ൌ Xଵ/Xଶሻ.	 In	other	words,	
there	 is	 no	 scenario	 of	 a	 completely	 complementary	 or	 completely	 supplementary	
bond,	 but	 rather	 a	mixed	 scenario	 ሺcomplementary‐supplementaryሻ.17	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	it	can	be	seen	that	advantageous	selection	scenarios	have	more	supplementary	
levels	of	articulation	than	adverse	selection	scenarios.	
Result	1.	 In	 the	Colombian	scenario,	when	the	nature	of	 the	selection	 is	more	
adverse	 ሺrespectively	 advantageousሻ,	 articulation	 between	 coverages	 is	 more	
complementary	ሺresp.	supplementaryሻ.	With	the	parameters	chosen	for	calibration,	it	
                                                            
16  In order to better describe the effect of the subsidy on public expenditure, simulation  includes negative 
values of the subsidy. However, we are interested in describing the effect of a positive value for the subsidy. 
17 Theoretically, the voluntary insurance services should offer a supplementary coverage, however there two 
reason why this does not happen. The first one is that most insurance companies in the voluntary insurance 
market  also  offer  coverage  in  the  public  insurance market, which means  they  have  incentives  to  report 
accounting  information  within  the  coverage  of  the  public  insurance.  The  second  reason  is  that  the 
government doesn’t monitor  the voluntary  insurance market. Government’s  information  systems are not 
effective and are subject to the information reported by the private insurance companies. 
can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 articulation	 in	 Colombia	 for	 2012	 is	 mixed	
ሺcomplementary‐supplementaryሻ.	
In	Figure	3,	the	dotted	vertical	line	found	in	the	value	of	0	subsidy	represents	
the	simulated	amount	of	public	expenses	for	each	selection	scenario	for	the	observed	
parameters	 in	Colombia	 for	2012.	The	dotted	horizontal	 line	 is	 the	estimated	public	
expense	reported	by	Barón	 ሺ2014ሻ	 for	2012	 in	 the	 contributive	 system.18	The	point	
where	those	two	lines	cross	represents	the	scenario	that	best	describes	the	observed	
data	in	Colombia	in	2012.	As	can	be	observed,	the	intersection	of	these	lines	is	located	
above	the	no	selection	scenario,	closer	 to	 the	simulated	adverse	selection	scenarios.		
Therefore,	 this	 figure	 tends	 to	 show	 that	 the	 scenario	 that	 comes	 closest	 to	what	 is	
observed	in	Colombia	by	the	parameters	of	this	simulation	ሺpreviously	describedሻ	is	
adverse	selection.	
Result	2.	In	the	Colombian	scenario,	the	nature	of	selection	that	is	closest	to	the	
official	health	system	figures	is	adverse.		
The	 slope	 of	 the	 expenditure	 function	 relative	 to	 the	 subsidy	 can	 be	 seen	 in	
figure	3.	The	higher	the	 level	of	subsidy	is,	without	changes	in	the	optimum	relation	
between	coverages	for	the	observed	data	for	2012,	the	higher	public	expense	is,	both	
for	adverse	and	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	Finally,	 the	slope	is	steeper	in	the	
scenarios	of	adverse	selection,	which	explains	why	the	degree	of	complementarity	is	
greater	than	it	is	other	selection	scenarios.	
	
3.3	Simulation	2:	Effect	of	changes	in	articulation	between	coverages	and	the	subsidy	
on	public	expenses	
	
Scenarios	are	considered	in	which	a	change	in	the	level	of	articulation	between	
coverages	 is	made,	from	α∗	to	 	α,	greater	or	 less	than	α∗.	This	works	proposes	α	as	a	
policy	tool	because	it	can	be	modified	through	health	system	legislation.	In	Colombia,	
for	 instance,	 there	 was	 a	 proposal	 made	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 Social	
Protection	 to	 modify	 the	 articulation	 between	 public	 insurance	 and	 voluntary	
ሺprivateሻ	coverages	towards	a	purely	supplementary	articulation.		
Figures	 4	 and	 5	 reveal	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 the	 public	 expenditure	
function	for	different	values	of	alpha,	each	proposed	for	different	selection	scenarios.	
                                                            
18 The official observed estimation is Barón’s for 2004 and 2011. It is published in Cifras financieras del 
Sector Salud. Gasto en Salud de Colombia: 2004‐2011. Boletín bimestral no 2. Enero – Febrero del 2014. 
Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social. (Financial Figures of the Health sector. Health Expenses in Colombia: 
2004‐2011). For 2011 this figure was $17.372.703. However, Baron made a presentation in Medellin on 
November 7, 2014, where the progress in health accounting in Colombia from 2004 to 2013 is shown and 
proposes an estimate of $ 19,607,686 for 2012. 
(http://www.udea.edu.co/portal/page/portal/bibliotecaSedesDependencias/unidadesAcademicas/Facultad
CienciasEconomicas/ElementosDiseno/Documentos/Memorias/general/Cuentas%20de%20Salud%20de%20
Colombia_%20Gilberto%20Bar%C3%B3n.pdf 16 de marzo de 2015). This last figure is used in our simulation 
exercise and corresponds to the dotted horizontal line in Figure 3. 
 
Each	selection	scenario	has	a	unique	α∗	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	Colombia;	these	are	shown	in	Table	1.	Each	figure	has	different	changes	in	the	level	
of	 articulation	 between	 coverages	 through	 different	 values	 of	 alpha.	 The	maximum	
corresponds	to	0.89	ሺα ൌ Xଵ/Xଶሻ,	in	this	case	articulation	is	purely	complementary.	It	
corresponds	 to	 the	 fuchsia	 line	 in	 Figures	 4	 and	 5.	 The	minimum	 value	 for	 α	 is	 0,	
which	happens	when	articulation	is	purely	supplementary;	it	corresponds	to	the	blue	
line	 in	 figures	4	and	5.	For	mixed	articulation,	other	values	of	α	between	 these	 two	
limits	 are	 simulated.	 Each	 figure	 has	 a	 dotted	 black	 line	 that	 corresponds	 to	 basal	
public	expense	amount	in	the	scenario	of	no	subsidy	and	without	changes	in	α∗	so	that	
the	 area	 bellow	 the	 dotted	 line	 corresponds	 to	 the	 different	 values	 of	 subsidy	 and	
changes	 in	 coverage	 articulation	 that	 induce	 a	 reduction	 in	 public	 expenditure.	 The	
area	above	the	dotted	line	corresponds	to	subsidy	and	articulation	combinations	that	
lead	to	public	expense	increase.	
Figures	4.A	and	4.B	correspond	to	simulated	adverse	selection	scenarios.	4.A	is	
the	 scenario	where	 the	highest	 intensity	of	adverse	selection	 is	 simulated	ሺkൌ0.33ሻ.	
For	 this	 scenario	 α∗ ൌ 0.73	 because	 the	 only	 value	 of	 α	 that	 comprises	 a	 rise	 in	
complementarity	of	coverages	is	α ൌ 0.89,	which	corresponds	to	a	situation	of	perfect	
complementarity.	 The	 other	 simulated	 values	 of	 α	 correspond	 to	 increases	 in	
supplementarity	of	articulation.	This	 figure	ሺ4.Aሻ	corresponds	to	the	scenario	where	
there	is	a	greater	quantity	of	subsidy	amounts	that	allow	for	public	expenses	to	reduce	
ሺarea	 under	 the	 dotted	 lineሻ.	 Figure	 4.B	 describes	 a	 scenario	 with	 less	 intensity	 of	
adverse	selection	that	also	has	less	complementarity	relative	to	the	previous	scenario.	
In	 this	 scenario	 it	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 that	 plenty	 subsidy	 amounts	 can	 reduce	 public	
expenditure.	 The	 simulation	 results	 presented	 in	 figures	 4.A	 and	 4.B	 confirm	 the	
findings	in	the	theoretical	model,	specifically	as	described	in	section	ሺiiሻ	of	Proposition	
1.	 That	 is,	 that	 in	 scenarios	 of	 adverse	 selection	 there	 are	 different	 options	 for	
reducing	public	expenses	through	a	subsidy	policy	together	with	a	change	in	coverage	
articulation,	towards	a	more	supplementary	articulation	ሺlower	αሻ.	
Result	 3.	 In	 the	 Colombian	 scenario,	 there	 are	 different	 options	 in	 which	 a	
subsidy	can	reduce	public	expenditure,	these	correspond	to	a	combination	of	changes	
in	articulation	of	coverages	 towards	more	supplementary	scenarios,	 together	with	a	
certain	 subsidy	 level.	 It	 is	more	 likely	 for	 a	 subsidy	 to	 reduce	 expenses	 in	 adverse	
selection	scenarios.	
Figures	5.A	and	5.B	correspond	to	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	Figure	5.A	
is	 the	 scenario	 where	 the	 highest	 intensity	 of	 advantageous	 selection	 is	 simulated	
ሺkൌ2ሻ.	For	this	scenario	α∗ ൌ 0.41	so	that	three	of	the	simulated	values	of	change	in	α	
correspond	 to	 increases	 in	 complementarity	 of	 coverages	 ሺα ൌ 0.89,	α ൌ 0.71,	
α ൌ 0.53ሻ.	It	can	be	seen	that	for	this	scenario	there	are	less	values	of	the	subsidy	that	
reduce	public	 expenses.	 In	Figure	5.B	 there	are	more	values	of	 the	 subsidy	 that	are	
able	 to	 reduce	 public	 expenditure,	 however,	 the	 difference	 is	 not	 very	 significant	
compared	to	the	previous	figure.	The	results	from	this	simulation	correlate	with	those	
found	in	the	theoretical	model	in	section	ሺiሻ	of	Proposition	1.19	
	
3.4	Decomposition	of	the	effect	of	the	subsidy	
	
The	 only	 goal	 of	 the	 last	 numerical	 exercise	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 three	 terms	 of	
equation	ሺ9ሻ,	which	correspond	to	 the	decomposition	of	 the	effect	of	 the	subsidy	on	
public	 expense.20	 Initially,	 values	 of	 fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	 and	 Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	 were	 determined	 for	 each	
level	of	subsidy	and	for	each	selection	scenario.	As	the	value	of	hሾwෝሺsሻሿ	corresponds	to	
an	interval	that	varies	for	each	selection	scenario,	which	is	represented	in	Figure	2	as	
the	intersection	between	wෝሺsሻ	ሺthe	red	horizontal	lineሻ	and	the	probability	of	illness	
distribution	for	each	selection	scenario,	it	is	estimated	based	on	the	total	effect	of	the	
subsidy	and	equations	ሺ9.1ሻ	and	ሺ9.3ሻ.	Table	3	shows	the	calculated	values	of	fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	
and	Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	for	each	subsidy	amount	and	Figure	6	presents	the	distribution	of	hሾwෝሺsሻሿ	
used	in	each	selection	scenario.	
The	 global	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 the	 public	 expenditure	 function	 is	
determined	for	each	possible	subsidy	value.	As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	7,	as	the	subsidy	
increases	and	selection	becomes	more	adverse,	 the	global	effect	 increases.	The	scale	
used	for	the	vertical	axes	 is	hundreds	of	Colombian	pesos	ሺCOPሻ,	so	we	can	see	that	
the	effect	of	a	subsidy	of	1	COP	is	32.804.915,07	COP	in	the	adverse	selection	scenario	
and	16.164.296,9	COP	in	the	advantageous	selection	scenario.	
Regarding	the	decomposition	of	the	effect	of	the	three	terms	ሺ9.1ሻ,	ሺ9.2ሻ,	ሺ9.3ሻ,	
it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 first	 term	 is	 always	 negative	 in	 advantageous	 selection	 and	
positive	 in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	In	the	neutral	selection	scenario,	this	term	is	
almost	 zero.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 term	 includes	 the	difference	between	 average	
probabilities	of	illness	between	individuals	in	the	two	different	coverages,	it	captures	
the	 fact	 that	 as	 selection	 is	 more	 adverse,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	
expenditure	is	larger	ሺFigure	8ሻ.	
The	second	term	ሺ9.2ሻ	studies	the	complex	relationship	between	the	nature	of	
selection	and	articulation	of	coverages	ሺthis	was	also	mentioned	in	subsection	ሺiiሻ	of	
Proposition	1ሻ.	Figure	9	represents	the	second	term	of	the	effect	of	a	subsidy	on	public	
expenditure	ሺequation	9.2ሻ.	In	advantageous	selection	scenarios	there	are	some	areas	
where	a	subsidy	generates	a	reduction	 in	public	expense,	 these	correspond	 to	more	
supplementary	scenarios.		
                                                            
19 The results from the simulations with different distribution functions for (θ,φ) are presented in appendix 
2.  It  can  be  seen  that  there  are  differences  in magnitude,  nevertheless  conclusions  drawn  from  these 
simulations are the same that those drawn from a uniform distribution. 
20 For this exercise a uniform distribution was employed for θ and φ, simulating a population 10 times bigger 
than  the  last one. This was done with  the purpose of having  individuals  for which  small variations  in  the 
amount of the subsidy would turn out as changes in her disposition to pay such that it would intersect with 
the value of wෝሺsሻ. 
Last	of	all,	the	third	term	of	the	decomposition	of	the	equation	of	the	effect	of	
the	subsidy	on	public	expense	does	not	represent	a	big	share	of	the	overall	effect.		
	
4. Conclusions	
This	paper	analyses	the	impact	of	a	private	insurance	subsidy	on	expenses	made	
by	the	government	in	systems	where	there	are	both	public	and	private	insurance.	Two	
key	 determinants	 of	 this	 impact	 are	 analyzed:	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 the	
degree	 of	 articulation	 between	 coverages.	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	
individuals	in	two	dimensions,	related	to	the	inherited	risk	of	illness	and	preferences	
for	 preventive	 activities,	 a	 theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 which	 allows	 us	 to	
determine	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 subsidy	 decreases	 public	 spending.	
Furthermore	 a	 numerical	 simulation	was	made	 in	 order	 to	 recreate	 the	 Colombian	
scenario.	
The	 theoretical	 model	 reveals	 that	 in	 advantageous	 selection	 scenarios,	 the	
subsidy	can	increase	public	expenditure	if	coverage	articulation	is	complementary.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios,	 a	 subsidy	 can	 reduce	 spending	 if	
articulation	 is	 mainly	 supplementary.	 In	 intermediate	 scenarios,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
predict	 the	outcome.	The	numerical	exercise	recreates	 these	previous	situations	but	
also	provides	a	unique	articulation	value	α∗	that	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
for	each	simulated	selection	scenario.	According	to	this	numerical	exercise	and	under	
the	previously	described	conditions,	 it	can	be	seen	that	under	this	articulation	 level,	
there	 is	no	positive	subsidy	 that	can	diminish	public	 system	expenditure,	no	matter	
what	the	scenario	is.	Nonetheless,	a	combination	of	subsidy	and	changes	in	coverage	
articulation	 could	 diminish	 public	 spending,	 mainly	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios.	
This	 work	 leads	 to	 an	 interesting	 result	 which	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 using	 the	 articulation	
between	 public	 and	 private	 coverages	 as	 a	 public	 policy	 tool	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	
reduce	public	expenditure.		
This	work	does	not	take	into	account	the	oligopolistic	structure	in	coverage	2	
supply.	 It	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 take	 into	 account	 insurance	 companies’	 strategic	
behavior	which	includes	transaction	costs	and	utilities.	
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Table	1.	Description	of	the	simulated	data.	
  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hത2ሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,637  0,603  0,498  0,393  0,298 
hത1ሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,575  0,556  0,500  0,446  0,398 
α∗  0,728  0,712  0,651  0,558  0,418 
CU2  $14.529.919,38  $14.529.919,38 $14.529.919,38 $14.529.919,38  $14.529.919,38
CU1  $1.240.167,87  $1.282.590,58 $1.425.532,82 $1.595.760,73  $1.792.063,10
α∗:	unique	level	of	articulation,	for	each	type	of	selection,	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	the	Colombian	market	for	2012.		
	
Table	2.	Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	demand	for	different	coverage	levels.	
Population* 
Subsidy Coverage 1  Coverage 2  Total Population 
 $                    ‐     16.851  1.799  18.650 
 $           10.000   16.798  1.852  18.650 
 $           20.000   16.742  1.908  18.650 
 $           50.000   16.566  2.084  18.650 
 $         100.000   16.255  2.395  18.650 
 $         200.000   15.566  3.084  18.650 
*Number	of	people	in	thousands.	
	
	
Table	3.	Values	of	fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	and	Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ	calculated	for	each	subsidy	level.	
	
Subsidy  fሾwෝሺsሻሿ Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ
‐$           200.000   2,05421E‐07 0,9549008
‐$           100.000   2,52895E‐07 0,9313044
‐$              50.000   2,76632E‐07 0,9174768
‐$              20.000   2,90874E‐07 0,9089586
‐$              10.000   3,05116E‐07 0,9003896
 $                       ‐     3,00369E‐07 0,9035331
 $              10.000   3,05116E‐07 0,9003896
 $              20.000   3,09864E‐07 0,897425
 $              50.000   3,24106E‐07 0,8878383
 $            100.000   3,47843E‐07 0,8707612
 $            200.000   3,95317E‐07 0,8325526
	
	
Figure	1.	Distribution	of	the	probability	of	illness	for	each	type	of	coverage	and	
selection	scenario.	
	
	
		
Figure	 1	 describes	 three	 scenarios.	 Aሻ	 Adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 with	 k൏1.	
The	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 2	 is	
greater	 than	 that	 of	 the	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 1.	 Bሻ	 No	 selection	
scenario	 ሺkൌ1ሻ.	 The	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	
both	coverages	is	equal.	Cሻ	Advantageous	selection	scenario,	with	k൐1.		
Figure	2.	Distribution	of	the	willingness	to	pay	according	to	the	probability	of	
illness	for	each	selection	scenario.	
	
	
		
Three	 scenarios:	 Aሻ	 Adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 with	 k൏1.	 Bሻ	 No	 selection	
scenario,	 with	 kൌ1.	 Cሻ	 Advantageous	 selection	 scenario	 ሺk൐1ሻ.	 The	 red	 line	
corresponds	to	the	value	wෝ ൌ 2.270.000.	
	 	
Figure	 3.	 Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 different	 prevailing	
selection	scenarios,	leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
	
One	 can	 see	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 the	 expenditure	 function	 according	 to	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 selection	 without	 changes	 in	 the	 equilibrium	 articulation	 level.	 Each	
colored	line	represents	the	expenditure	function	for	a	different	selection	scenario.	The	
two	uppermost	 lines	 ሺblue	and	 redሻ	are	 the	adverse	 selection	 scenarios;	 the	middle	
line	ሺgreenሻ	represents	the	no	selection	scenario;	and	the	lowermost	lines	ሺyellow	and	
greyሻ	represent	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	The	vertical	dotted	line	represents	
the	value	of	zero	subsidy.	The	horizontal	dotted	line	is	the	estimated	value	of	public	
expenditure	for	Colombia	for	2012	ሺ$	19.607.686ሻ.	 	
Figure	 4.	 Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 different	 levels	 of	
articulation	between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	
4.A.	kൌ0.33	
	
4.B.	kൌ0.5		
	
The	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 spending	 can	 be	 seen	 for	 different	 levels	 of	
articulation	between	coverages	ሺvalues	of	alphaሻ	 in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	The	
dotted	 line	 represents	 the	 simulated	 value	 of	 public	 expenditure	without	 a	 subsidy	
and	with	α∗	that	 is	unique	for	each	selection	scenario.	4.A.	Scenario	with	the	highest	
intensity	 of	 adverse	 selection	 ሺkൌ0.33ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.73.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	 is	 $20.518.706.720,64.	 4.B.	 Scenario	 with	 less	 intensity	 of	 adverse	
selection	 ሺkൌ0.5ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.71.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	 expenditure	 is	
$19.709.817.294,31.	
	 	
Figure	5.	Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	
of	articulation	between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	
5.A.	kൌ2	
	
5.B.	kൌ1.5		
	
Figure	 5.	 One	 can	 see	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 different	
levels	 of	 articulation	 between	 coverages	 ሺvalues	 of	 alphaሻ	 in	 scenarios	 of	
advantageous	 selection.	 The	 dotted	 line	 represents	 the	 simulated	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	without	a	subsidy	and	with	α∗	that	is	unique	for	each	selection	scenario;	
under	 this	 line	 there	 are	 savings	 in	 public	 spending.	 5.A.	 Scenario	with	 the	 highest	
intensity	 of	 advantageous	 selection	 ሺkൌ2ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.41.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	 is	$12.540.415.534,67.	5.B.	Scenario	with	 less	 intensity	of	advantageous	
selection	 ሺkൌ1.5ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.55.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	 expenditure	 is	
$14.767.419.231,73.	 	
Figure	6.	Distribution	of	the	values	of	hሾwෝሺsሻሿ	used	in	each	selection	scenario.	
	
Figure	7.	Overall	effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure
	
	 	
Figure	8.	First	effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	ሺequation	9.1ሻ	
	
	
Figure	9.	Second	effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	ሺequation	9.2ሻ	
	
Flowchart	1:	Calibration	strategy	
	
   
Flowchart	2:	Simulation	exercise	
	
 
	 	
Appendix	1:	Derivative	of	the	expenditure	function	with	respect	to	the	subsidy		
	
The	expenditure	function	is:	
Gሺθ, φ, sሻ ൌ XଵCUଵhതଵሺθ, φ, sሻሾ1 െ Dଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ ൅ αXଶCUଶhതଶሺθ, φ, sሻDଶሺθ, φ, sሻ ൅ sሾDଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ.	
	
As	in	the	previous	case,	we	write	the	function	in	terms	of	s,	therefore:	
	
݀Gሺsሻ
݀ݏ ൌ X
ଵCUଵ ቈܨሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ ݀ ത݄
ଵሺݏሻ
݀ݏ ൅ ݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ
݀ݓෝሺݏሻ
݀ݏ ത݄
ଵሺݏሻ቉
൅ αXଶCUଶ ቈሺ1 െ ܨሾݓෝሺݏሻሿሻ ݀ ത݄
ଶሺݏሻ
݀ݏ െ ݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ
݀ݓෝሺݏሻ
݀ݏ ത݄
ଶሺݏሻ቉	
൅1 െ ܨሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ െ ݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ ݀ݓෝሺݏሻ݀ݏ ݏ	
ൌ XଵCUଵ ݀ݓෝሺݏሻ݀ݏ ቂെത݄
ଵሺݏሻሺ1 െ ݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿሻ ൅ ݄ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿቃ
൅ αXଶCUଶ ݀ݓෝሺݏሻ݀ݏ ቂത݄
ଶሺݏሻሺ1 െ 	݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿሻ െ ݄ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿቃ	
൅1 െ ܨሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ െ ݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿ ݀ݓෝሺݏሻ݀ݏ ݏ	
	
Adding	and	subtracting	the	term	XଵCUଵ ௗ௪ෝሺ௦ሻௗ௦ ቂ ത݄ଶሺݏሻሺ1 െ 	݂ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿሻ െ ݄ሾݓෝሺݏሻሿቃ,	one	finds:	
	
dGሺsሻ
ds ൌ X
ଵCUଵ dwෝሺsሻds ቂሺ1 െ fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ ቀhത
ଶሺsሻ െ hതଵሺsሻቁቃ
൅ dwෝሺsሻds ቂhത
ଶሺsሻሺ1 െ 	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ െ hሾwෝሺsሻሿቃ ሾαXଶCUଶ െ XଵCUଵሿ	
൅1 െ Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ െ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ ୢ୵ෝ ሺୱሻୢୱ s.	
 
	 	
Appendix	2:	Simulations	of	scenarios	with	different	probability	distributions	
	
Inverse	 transform	 sampling	 is	 used	 to	 randomly	 generated	 data	 with	 a	 uniform	
distribution	 for	 θ	 and	φ,	with	 θ	φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.	 Based	 on	 this	 data,	 simulation	 is	 done	 in	
Excel	 for	 different	 distributions	 with	 parameters	 known	 for	 these	 two	 dimensions	
which	characterize	individuals.		
The	 interpretation	 of	 the	 results	 of	 the	 simulation	with	 different	 distributions	 does	
not	differ	very	much	from	those	of	a	uniform	distribution.	It	can	be	summarized	in	the	
following	way:	
1. The	degree	of	articulation	between	coverages	is	of	mixed	characteristics,	which	
varies	depending	on	the	proposed	scenario.	
2. Regarding	 public	 expenditure,	 the	 scenario	 that	 is	 closest	 to	 the	 observed	
results	for	Colombia	is	the	adverse	selection	scenario.	
3. Only	a	change	in	the	articulation	policy	between	coverages,	together	with	the	
presence	 of	 subsidies	 can	 reduce	 total	 public	 spending.	 The	 range	 of	
possibilities	is	wider	in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	
The	main	results	of	these	simulations	are	described	below.	
	
	 	
BETA	DISTRIBUTION	ሺParameter	aൌ0.4	y	parameter	bൌ0.5ሻ	
	
Description	of	the	simulated	data	
  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,646  0,611  0,500  0,390  0,291 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,563  0,546  0,499  0,456  0,417 
α∗  0,720  0,703  0,638  0,535  0,377 
CUଶ   $  13.921.532,83    $  13.921.532,83   $  13.921.532,83   $  13.921.532,83    $  13.921.532,83 
CUଵ   $     1.265.796,51    $     1.303.776,40   $     1.427.075,58   $     1.564.121,26    $    1.709.350,23 
α∗:	unique	level	of	articulation,	for	each	type	of	selection,	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	the	Colombian	market	for	2012.		
	
	
Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 each	 prevailing	 selection	 scenario,	
leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Effect	of	 the	 subsidy	on	public	 expenditure	with	 changes	 in	 the	 level	 of	 articulation	
between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
EXPONENTIAL	DISTRIBUTION	ሺParameter	Lambdaൌ1.1ሻ	
	
Description	of	the	simulated	data	
  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,653  0,616  0,501  0,387  0,286 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,603  0,577  0,500  0,424  0,354 
α∗  0,703  0,686  0,614  0,500  0,323 
CUଶ   $  13.033.152,93    $  13.033.152,93   $  13.033.152,93   $  13.033.152,93    $  13.033.152,93 
CUଵ   $     1.180.691,21    $     1.233.848,90   $     1.425.722,33   $     1.680.989,37    $    2.014.574,33 
α∗:	unique	level	of	articulation,	for	each	type	of	selection,	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	the	Colombian	market	for	2012.	
	
Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 each	 prevailing	 selection	 scenario,	
leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
NORMAL	DISTRIBUTION	ሺAverageൌ1.1	and	standard	deviationൌ0.2ሻ	 	
	
	
Description	of	the	simulated	data	
  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,680  0,637  0,500  0,364  0,248 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,659  0,620  0,500  0,380  0,273 
α∗  0,643  0,619  0,515  0,334  0,020 
CUଶ   $  10.395.267,90    $  10.395.267,90   $  10.395.267,90   $  10.395.267,90    $  10.395.267,90 
CUଵ   $     1.081.147,30    $     1.148.461,42   $     1.425.824,54   $     1.876.860,25    $    2.606.920,72 
α∗:	unique	level	of	articulation,	for	each	type	of	selection,	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	the	Colombian	market	for	2012.		
	
Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 each	 prevailing	 selection	 scenario,	
leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
GAMMA	DISTRIBUTION	ሺParameter	aൌ0.5	and	parameter	bൌ1.5ሻ	
	
Description	of	the	simulated	data	
  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,670  0,614  0,507  0,449  0,413 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,563  0,546  0,502  0,466  0,436 
α∗  0,515  0,470  0,359  0,276  0,212 
CUଶ   $     7.755.411,47    $     7.755.411,47   $     7.755.411,47   $     7.755.411,47    $    7.755.411,47 
CUଵ   $     1.266.664,85    $     1.305.106,11   $     1.419.849,59   $     1.530.075,77    $    1.632.873,66 
α∗:	unique	level	of	articulation,	for	each	type	of	selection,	which	solves	the	observed	equilibrium	price	
in	the	Colombian	market	for	2012.	
	
Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 each	 prevailing	 selection	 scenario,	
leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
